Schedule 13d
| Filed by: | GREENBERG MAURICE R |
| Subject Company: | AMER INTL GROUP INC |
| Filed as of Date: | 10/14/2008 |
| View Original Filing on Edgar's | |
Exhibit
2
October
13, 2008
Mr.
Edward Liddy
Chairman
& Chief Executive Officer
American
International Group, Inc.
70 Pine
Street
New York,
New York 10270
Dear
Ed,
I am
attaching our plan to save AIG.
As you
know, AIG is in crisis. The loan from the Federal government to AIG,
as it is currently structured, will result in the liquidation of AIG, the loss
of thousands of jobs, and the irretrievable loss of billions of dollars in
shareholder value.
The loan
is for a two-year term and carries approximately a 14% annual interest rate,
including a 8.5% annual rate whether AIG takes down the loan or not, plus a 2%
one-time commitment fee. To the extent AIG actually draws on the loan
facility, it pays additional interest at the annual rate of
LIBOR. Consequently, the loan carries an actual interest rate in
excess of 14% and on top of that, the government receives 79.9% of the ownership
of AIG. Bottom-line, this means that AIG cannot pay off this loan
from the proceeds of selling assets in this market, nor can it pay the annual
interest rate from earnings. As a result, thousands of jobs will be
lost, pensioners will lose their savings, and millions of shareholders will be
disenfranchised. It is a lose/lose plan.
On the
other hand, if the loan were changed to non-voting preferred stock, with an
approximately 5-6% dividend and a 10-year right of redemption for AIG at a 10%
premium, this could be turned into a win/win situation.
Please
see the attached plan for further details.
Sincerely,
/s/ Maurice R. Greenberg
Last
month, AIG’s Board of Directors entered into an agreement with the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York to obtain a two-year, $85 billion credit facility (the
“Credit Facility”). The Credit Facility requires AIG to pay a 2
percent one-time commitment fee and interest of 8.5 percent per annum on undrawn
capital (the rate on drawn capital is LIBOR plus 8.5 percent). The
deal also includes the issuance of super-voting preferred stock that is intended
to deliver ownership of 79.9 percent of AIG to the United States
Treasury.
The
transaction is a “lose/lose” for all concerned.
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By
requiring AIG to pay interest on money it does not borrow, the agreement
encourages the company to draw down the full amount of the loan even if it
does not need the capital. In order to service the principal
and interest on this loan, AIG will have no choice but to engage in a
fire-sale of profitable assets. The likelihood of being
able to do so at reasonable prices in today’s market decreases with each
passing day.
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Forcing
AIG into liquidation will damage irreparably its tens of thousands of
workers, pension funds that are significant AIG stockholders and retirees
and millions of other ordinary Americans who are AIG stockholders, among
others. Thousands of jobs will be lost and employees’ savings
wiped out.
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At
a minimum, AIG should be afforded the same borrowing terms as other
companies.
Since
the time the Credit Facility was entered into, the Federal Reserve has stepped
up direct lending to scores of financial institutions and, for the first time
last week, to non-financial institutions. They are able to borrow on
terms far less onerous than those imposed on AIG (the discount window primary
credit rate for October 9th was 1.75 percent).
AIG
has more than $1 trillion in assets, including key AIG assets that already act
as security for the $85 billion loan facility. That security provides
sufficient protection to American taxpayers. It is not necessary to
wipe out virtually all of the shareholder value held by AIG’s millions of
shareholders, including scores of ordinary Americans.
Who
is the winner in this scenario? It is hard to find one, except
perhaps for certain of AIG’s transactional counterparties, who faced exposure in
the tens of billions of dollars if AIG had filed for bankruptcy
protection.
Although
time is of the essence, it is not too late to change the terms of the AIG deal
and protect the interests of both the American taxpayer and the numerous AIG
employees, stockholders and others that will be impacted by AIG’s
liquidation.
The
terms of the Credit Facility and preferred stock issuance could be amended into
a “win/win” as follows:
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The
government would acquire non-voting preferred stock in AIG that pays a 5
or 6 percent annual dividend. This would be a respectable
spread over the cost of money to the Federal
Reserve.
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AIG
would have the right to redeem the preferred over a period of 10 years at
a 10 percent premium.
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Such
a plan would have an immediate impact on the market and would save AIG
from being liquidated. The United States would retain a great
company, jobs would not be lost, share value would increase, and sales of
assets could be undertaken in a more orderly fashion than what is
currently contemplated.
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If
need be, AIG would raise third-party funds, and could ultimately have a
Rights offering at a time when markets are more stable and the sale of
assets, as indicated, could take place in an orderly
manner.
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The
role of government should not be to force a company out of business, but rather
to help it to stay in business, especially a company that has been the pride of
its industry.
Such
a plan should get a positive response from the rating agencies which could lead
to the possible reduction in collateral calls, which is one of the issues
burdening AIG. Moreover, AIG would be eligible to sell some of its
toxic securities to the new $700 billion fund, and finally, there might be some
modification in mark-to-market accounting rules that could provide some relief
during these turbulent times until the markets stabilize. If the
foregoing occurs, AIG could in all likelihood redeem the preferred in less than
10 years.
The
above steps would provide a very positive signal to the market and would be a
step forward toward restoring confidence and stabilizing the broader financial
system.


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